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There is a movement gaining strength to bring free-market initiatives into the government reform
process. This trend is visible in all areas of government, but nowhere more so than in the military.
Due to its size, the military has always been under pressure to increase productivity in order to free
capital for spending on domestic concerns. These pressures usually originated outside the
Department of Defense (DOD) in congressional committees or reformist "think tanks". Recently,
however, senior staff within DOD and the Office of the Secretary are viewing management reform
as a way to meet the challenges of shifting mission priorities and shrinking resources. While
previous efforts to streamline the military have centered on greater regulation and tighter control,
the free-market reforms currently being discussed would reduce some of these restrictions. The
question which arises is how well the free market can be applied to government operations in
general and the military in particular.
Fallows [1] speaks of a "managerial" approach to the military. It is the desire to treat defense as
a straightforward and efficient business using economics and management science. The shortcoming
of this approach is in its inability to distinguish between technical or economic efficiency and mission
effectiveness. Specifically, this results from the use of oversimplified one-dimensional forms of
analysis. The origin of this methodology can be traced back to the end of World War II.
With the Hoover Commission report in 1949, the government began to shift away from
expenditure control and toward performance budgeting. The goal of this approach was to improve
the operational efficiency of government institutions. Cost accounting and work measurement
initiatives were developed to support this effort. Unit costing first appeared in discussions during
this period. These efforts went on for twenty years before culminating in the 1960's. In 1961
specific planning guidance was incorporated into the evolving defense management system to form
the Planning Programming and Budgeting system (PPB).
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The primary focus of PPB is stated to be planning, with opportunity costs at the margin acting as
the primary driver. The system is intended to rationalize policy-making by providing cost and
benefit data for alternative planning and by providing output measures to evaluate whether chosen
objectives are attained. A comparison of performance budgeting and PPB in LaCivita and Pirog [2]
leads to the conclusion that performance budgeting and unit costing, if used correctly, could promote
efficiency in existing operations while marginal analysis determines whether alternate activities could
obtain desired objectives more efficiently. In an era of rapidly decreasing defense budgets,
consolidation and base closure, it seems that planning should be the focus with marginal costs
serving as the primary analysis tool.
Two schools of economists, however, argue that marginalism is inadequate as an analysis tool.
The institutionalist school of American economists insists that economic actions can only be
understood within the framework of history and contemporary laws, customs and attitudes. The
radical political economists are also concerned with the fact that marginal analysis ignores history
and present institutions and concerns itself too narrowly with the mechanics of choice. The author
believes that marginal analysis is the only "rational" tool for economic analysis and will rely heavily
on it in evaluating the theoretical basis for unit costing. However, in an effort to address the
concerns of these other schools, "soft economics" will also be discussed in determining the
appropriateness of unit costing to government operations. This effort will center on the unique
nature of naval operations and the consumer environment.
A number of theories exist to explain consumer behavior, but the best known and most widely
used is utility analysis. Utility analysis attempts to measure and predict satisfaction. Knowledge of
consumers' total and marginal utility allows one to develop demand curves for those consumers. In
the case of a naval shipyard, the primary consumers are the ships undergoing repairs, upgrades and
maintenance. Their level of satisfaction is driven by a number of different elements such as price of
the services, quality of workmanship, timeliness of job completion, technical competence and
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capability, and convenience or availability. In a competitive environment, consumers would evaluate
all these elements in deciding what work to have done at which installations.
Unit cost measures only the cost per unit of output or "bang for the buck." Decisions based
primarily on these criteria run the risk of neglecting important considerations such as method of
employment, support and mission effectiveness. While there is stated intent to incorporate
performance and quality measures into the unit cost system, current measures consider only financial
information.
The theory behind unit costing is that products and services should bear their full cost, including
overhead. By instituting some limited market choice within the military, low cost providers will be
rewarded with increased volume. Cost savings are expected to result as customers re-allocate their
demand to the cheapest sources. For producers, cost reduction will become a primary area of
interest to commanders. The unit cost financial information is expected to reveal the cost drivers,
allowing commanders to reduce them more effectively. It is expected that unit cost will improve
operations, allow for the evaluation of performance and budgets, support budget decisions and
sanction work re-allocation decisions.
Unit cost is supposed to focus the manager and policy maker on the internal workings of an
activity and its costs of doing business. Marginal analysis, on the other hand, allows policy makers to
evaluate multiple sources of production. Chapter II will explore these two measures and develop the
economic theory behind them. This development will include discussions of economies of scale,
technical and economic efficiency and the variability of inputs. An economic model will be proposed
against which a naval shipyard will be compared.
In Chapter III, the "soft economics" referred to above will be addressed in discussing the
adequacy of unit cost measures. Limitations of unit cost theory will be demonstrated through the
use of examples. Parallels to shipyard operations will be drawn in the discussion highlighting
advantages and dangers in the system and discussing the role of proposed unit cost system changes.
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Chapter IV will specifically discuss the application of unit cost theories in government operations.
The issue of consumer choice in the military setting will be reviewed as well as the applicability of
several proposed goals of the unit cost system. These include the topics of variability in budgets and
the use of economic data for personnel evaluation.
This thesis will furnish the reader with a development of unit cost economic theory and a model
to apply to government operations. That model will be matched against an operating naval shipyard.
The appropriateness of this model will be discussed as well as several other issues incorporated into
the Navy's unit cost system. Upon conclusion, it will be seen that the unit cost system is well
intentioned but currently includes a great many hidden dangers to both cost performance and
mission readiness. Further development of this program is needed before it can be effectively
implemented in the fleet.
II. ECONOMIC THEORY
A. OPERATING IN THE SHORT RUN
Any business, including a Navy shipyard, is characterized by a certain size or capacity.
Commitments, such as material contracts, personnel contracts and land leases, limit the flexibility of
the firm. Three time frames characterize the restrictions placed on a firm. In the short run, at least
one of the primary inputs cannot be varied. To change output, the firm adjusts its valuable inputs,
holding its fixed inputs constant. In the long run, all of the inputs can be varied. New plants can be
built to increase production and workers can be cut to lower capability and expense. In the very
long run new technology can enter the marketplace altering the production function itself.
In reality, Naval commands are very restricted in the short run. To illustrate, Mare Island Naval
Shipyard requested a reduction in force (RIF) in May 1992 to reduce overhead. The reduction was
to take effect on 13 November 1992. As of the beginning of December 1992, no action had been
taken on the request by higher authority. In short, the shipyard has been unable to alter the level of
the primary input (labor) over the time frame considered, that being the budget cycle.
Thus, military personnel is essentially a fixed input to the shipyard. A plan exists to cost military
personnel only at the lower civilian rate if they are in a billet solely for career progression or
rotational purposes. The fact remains, however, that these billets can not be readily eliminated. In
fact, the shipyard at Mare Island is forced to take a charge against unit cost for military billets
currently unfilled.
The distintion between fixed and variable costs has important implications for managers. The
unit cost system, however, implies that all costs are variable. One of the supposed advantages of the
unit cost concept is that the budget automatically fluctuates with changes in workload. This is
intended to remove uncertainty from the budget process. The problem is that all costs of operation
are not variable. In fact, the majority of expenses are not variable at many Naval installations. At
Mare Island Naval Shipyard, the comptroller reports that personnel costs account for approximately
seventy percent of the unit's total expenses. While much of this personnel cost would be considered
a variable cost by economists, it is not controllable to local management as discussed above. If half
of the remaining expenses, (property maintenance, depreciation and other G&A expenses) are truly
fixed in the economic sense of the word, then over eighty-five percent of the total expenses do not fit
the unit cost model.
The Unit Cost Resourcing Guidance [3] states that future efforts will attempt to better identify
fixed and variable costs. Until this is accomplished, however, the system remains critically flawed.
B. COSTS
To ellaborate on the distinction between cost categories, the total short run costs for a business
can be divided into total fixed cost and total variable cost. Total fixed cost does not vary with the
level of output. The total variable cost does change with any change in output or workload. Figure
1 shows a typical representation of these costs [4]. Note the shape of the total variable cost curve.
Total variable cost initially increases at a decreasing rate with production as economies of scale are
realized. Eventually, however, variable cost increases more rapidly as diminishing returns set in.
From the curves of Figure 1, we can derive four new measures in the short run; average fixed
cost, average variable cost, average total cost and marginal cost [4]. Average fixed cost is simply the
total fixed cost divided by output. It decreases with volume. Average variable cost is the total
variable cost divided by output. The average variable cost falls during early levels of production and
rises at high levels of production. The average total cost is the sum of average fixed and average
variable cost. The average total cost (ATC) curve is also known as the unit cost curve. The
Figure 1. Total cost curve;
relationship between these curves in given by Figure 2 [4]. One of the dangers of basing decisions
on unit cost is demonstrated by the "U" shape of the curve ATC curve. The "U" shape is the result
of the interaction between Fixed costs and the law of diminishing returns. Average fixed costs
decrease as output increases leading to the initial downward slope of the curve. Eventually,
however, the maximum efficiency point is reached and further production requires greater increases
in variable inputs for each additional unit of output. This will be further discussed under
diseconomies of scale. A firm on the upward sloping portion of the curve must actually lower
production to lower its average total cost.
A vital tool neglected by unit costing is the marginal cost of production. The relationship
between marginal cost, average total cost and average variable cost is shown in Figure 3 [4].
Marginal cost is derived by dividing the differential input cost by the differential output produced.
The marginal cost curve is also "U" shaped. It can be seen from Figure 3 that the marginal cost
curve intersects the average total cost curve and the average variable cost curve at their lowest point.
This is the key point in efficiency analysis and the critical flaw in unit costing. Obviously, when
choosing between numerous firms for increased production, the firm which should be chosen is the
one with the lowest marginal cost, or the one which will cost the least for the additional unit of
production. This may very well not be the firm with the lowest average total cost or average
variable cost.
C. ECONOMIES OF SCALE
In the long run, firms can operate in any one of three environments, economies of scale, constant
returns to scale and diseconomies of scale. In many cases, a firm with larger production capacity
can achieve lower average cost than a small volume operation. However, its advantage does not last
forever. Eventually, constant returns set in and larger plant size no longer provides lower average
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Figure 3. The marginal cost relationship
Figure 4 [4] illustrates total, average and marginal costs for economies of scale. Note that the
marginal cost is constantly decreasing. This results from constantly increasing production efficiencies
and decreasing average fixed costs as discussed above. This can be visualized by considering a
factory and assembly line. As more workers are added, they can pass work from one to another
more easily on the assembly line and increase productivity. This concept is a crucial element in
production allocation decisions. The same information is shown for constant return to scale in
Figure 5 [4]. Here the average and marginal costs are equal for all points. This must be so since
average cost is neither increasing or decreasing.
Diseconomies of scale appear in Figure 6 [4]. In this example, rising marginal cost leads
increasing average costs and total costs. Over-expanded facilities may increase support costs or have
physical properties which limit effectiveness at high volumes. This can be explained by again
considering the factory but with limited floor space. As units of production are added and more
workers are hired, the line becomes more crowded. Eventually the line will become so crowded that
workers will get in each others way and productivity will actually begin to decrease.
The resourcing guidance does state that it "may be desirable" to recognize cost differences
associated with the size of an activity. Obviously, larger activities with greater capital investment will
often report higher unit costs than small activities for lower output volumes. This difference is
critical when determining unit cost goals for an organization. While individual commanders operate
in the short run, the limitations placed on them are determined by long run considerations. Shop
capacity and infrastructure dictate a large portion of the overhead rate at any installation. Not all
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D. EFFICIENCY
A production function shows the maximum output which can be produced for a given level of
inputs. In effect, it states the constraints on production, usually in terms of labor and capital. The
production function is unique to each producer and is dependent on the resources available to the
producer at the time of interest. The production function can be changed in the long-run, but not in
the short-run.
The production function also describes a set of alternative input combinations which are said to
be technically efficient. A technically efficient combination means that there is no waste of resources.
No other method of production will result in the same output without using more of one input.
There are, however, many technically efficient means of achieving the same output. The
combination desired is that which is economically efficient. An economically efficient alternative is
the technically efficient alternative with the output levels where marginal benefit equals marginal
cost. A shipyard commander may employ his resources in a technically efficient manner but be
unable to employ them in an economically efficient manner.
E. MODEL
Navy activities can best be characterized as oligopolies. These are seller's markets which are
made up of a few firms producing anywhere from standardized to very differentiated products with
varied levels of barrier to entry. The term "few" denotes an interdependence among firms. Each is
affected by the actions of the others.
Level of output and price in an oligopoly are not determined by examining only consumer
demand and product cost. A level of gamesmanship enters the picture driving producer decisions.
Market share, competitor response and government procurement rules all come into play. Figure 7
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illustrates an oligopolist earning a long run economic profit [4]. This figure is very similar to a
monopolist's profit. The difference lies in the derivation of the demand curve.
While the demand curve is expected to be more elastic than in a pure monopoly, and less so than
in industries with several competing suppliers, there will be an enormous amount of price rigidity in
an oligopoly. Firms are typically risk adverse and reluctant to disturb the status quo. Disturbing the
status quo may energize their competitors and the ultimate outcome is uncertain. Often advertising
and product or service changes are implemented rather than price changes in this market. Selling
superior service is much safer than lowering price because it avoids directly affronting a competitor.
There is typically enough competition in oligopolistic markets to force producers to produce on their









































One troubling aspect of unit costing is the claim that it will allow managers to "measure the
improved efficiency" in their organizations. This is a dangerous conclusion as it equates efficiency
with the cost per unit of output. The trouble arises in determining a measurable output which
accurately reflects the mission of the activity. Too much emphasis on cost may cause managers to
reduce current cost at the expense of quality and cost reducing capital investment or distort
production between primary and secondary outputs.
As an example, the Unit Cost Resourcing Guidance [3] defines the primary mission for Inventory
Control Points as satisfying customer material requirements. The primary output measure used in
measuring satisfaction is given as cost per dollar of gross stock fund sales. In a Navy dedicated to
quality, how is quality reflected in an output measure of gross sales? There is no accounting for
delivery times, adequate stockage, percentage of defective materials or percentage of incorrect
transactions. Surely, these are all critical to satisfying customer material requirements. When
ultimately servicing combat units, it can be persuasively argued that these elements are more critical
to satisfying the mission than the cost of operating the control point.
A second example from the resourcing guidance mandates that each service assign unit cost goals
to recruiting activities. Unless additional measures such as average ASVAB scores or education
level are considered, a significant risk exists that recruiters will not take on extra expense to compete
for top quality personnel in the marketplace. By relying too much on any cost measure, the service
runs the risk of reducing the caliber of recruits just as downsizing forces greater reliance on each
individual. The results of these actions may have significant long-term costs which overwhelm any
short-term savings.
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These questions and risks certainly pertain to the shipyard example. Repair or replace decisions
are at the heart of the unit cost effort. It may often be cheaper, in terms of cost per manhour
expended, to repair systems rather than replace them. Design services are not required for repairs.
Neither are extensive supply orders or other support services which carry high overhead. This may
not be the most efficient or effective choice though. Unit cost data implies that it is better to repair
a unit numerous times rather than replacing it once, even if the total cost of the repair is higher.
Each time the item is repaired, it lowers the shipyard average total cost, despite the fact that the
total cost is rising beyond the replacement value. Further, the ship is left with a less reliable piece
of equipment. It may seem cheaper to patch-up and patch-up an old car, but eventually, the costs
will grow beyond the value of the automobile. Further, it will not be reliable and eventually it will
fail catastrophically.
Shipyard operations do have the advantage of a separate enforcement mechanism for quality.
During overhauls, a responsible member of the ships crew must certify that the job has been
properly completed before it can be "signed off." While dispute may occasionally arise, the advocacy
of the operation is a strong controlling force. Without such external mechanism, activities could
achieve unit cost savings by lowering quality.
The issue of long-term costs becomes even more acute with the capital budget, including military
construction (MILCON), operations and maintenance (O&M), research development test and
evaluation (RDT&E), and procurement. Since capital budget expense is allocated in the same way
as G&A, there is a strong incentive to reduce costs from these areas. This has dire implications for
future software development and R&D efforts, as these endeavors usually require large investments
which may not yield significant results during the tenure of the military personnel involved. Since
there is no output measure for support of new cost saving measures, it seems inevitable that
pressure to meet ever decreasing cost goals will force significant cutbacks in R&D. Any attempt to
alter the production function in the very long run will only penalize managers as start-up and
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development costs are reflected in the short run cost data. This shortcoming will only reduce the
opportunities for greater savings and breakthroughs in the future.
Gates and Terasawa [5] address this conflict from an analytical standpoint. In perfect
competition, firms cannot affect price. Therefore, all savings resulting over time from improved
operations are retained as profit. Since the shipyard model is an oligopoly, however, changes in
costs will affect prices. Further, since the allowable price will be adjusted downward with costs
under unit costing, the profit incentive is reduced as well.
Augmentation and mobilization stocks in supply operations, and real-property maintenance
projects in excess of $15,000, are also included in the capital budget. This is despite comments in
the DBOF implementation plan report [5] which states that mobilization and surge costs are
intended to be directly funded, thereby removing them from unit cost calculations. By including
these expenses in the unit cost calculation, managers are forced to trade off maintenance and
quality-of-life improvements against vital operational costs. These items are not equal in terms of
funding flexibility or operational effect. They are, however, currently equal under the budget.
Under the current guidance, operational commanders will have little choice but to attack
maintenance in searching for savings just as with R&D. Again the question arises as to whether
these actions are in the long-term interests of the force. Different funding categories exist
specifically to avoid salvaging support elements in favor of a few more operational dollars or a lower
unit cost. Without separate measures to insure adequate attention, this funding structure encourages
commanders to neglect all considerations but the "bottom line".
The proposed unit cost system does acknowledge the presence of "primary" and "other" outputs.
It is important to keep these separate so that altered demand for "other" outputs does not cloud the
operating data with respect to the primary output. However, the controls currently in place are not
sufficient to accomplish this. Since these outputs may or may not be related, a strong incentive
exists to shift costs from the primary output to any others. In this way, commanders will look good
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to superiors while distorting market relationships with others. The result is that activities using the
secondary outputs will be forced to create unnecessary duplication in an effort to avoid paying for
the overpriced services. At the same time, the producing activity is encouraged to expend efforts
building markets for their secondary outputs in an effort to reduce their visible "primary" output
costs. This draws operational commanders into budgeting "gamesmanship." Budget priorities are
distorted and future development endangered in favor of short-term budget savings.
Mare Island's comptroller states that the shipyard is one cost center for unit costing purposes.
Performance is measured by "grading" against a single rate, which equates to total costs (both direct
T 4- K + F
and overhead) divided by total direct labor hours. Specifically, ATC = where, L =
labor dollars, K = direct capital and E = materials expense, all other overhead and G/A expense,
and MH = manhours expended. All shops within the shipyard use the same acceleration rate for
overhead but use different applied rates when accounting to the customer. While the shipyard is
charging customers properly for the type of work done, staff is seeing only the composite results of
all work. Obviously, the breakdown of work performed has an enormous effect on the total cost.
With the equation above, quick efficient repairs may acatually penalize the shipyard's unit cost.
Manpower intensive jobs are much more desirable under this system because they spread capital
material and overhead expenses over a larger base. The apparent incentive is for shipyard to "load
up" on labor intensive jobs, and "pile on" manhours for each job to further spread expenses and
lower unit cost.
The long range plan for unit costing is to incorporate performance and quality goals into the
operating budgets. Monitoring these goals should limit the amount of gamesmanship involved in
management. Unfortunately, it will also reduce the options available to managers in response to
budget pressures. Current performance measures in the maintenance world include on time
performance, funded backlogs and supply inventory measures. At this time, however, managers are
unsure how any of these performance measures will be viewed in relation to the "bottom-line" unit
17
cost data. As more repair contracts become open to bid from civilian shipyards, the relative weight
of these and other performance measures becomes even more critical.
B. COMPARABILITY
A key point to unit costs are that they are activity and output level specific. Comparisons
between work locations are invalid. So too are comparisons between periods of differing workload
at the same location. This leads to inevitable questions regarding how unit costing data will be used.
One concern is that, unit cost data will indeed be used to make improper comparisons leading to
incorrect reallocation decisions. The DBOF Implementation Plan Report [6] lists the improved ability
of congress to influence operations and exercise oversight as a major benefit of the program.
Providing detailed operating data to congress seems to be an open invitation to greater
micromanagement and distortion of resources. Once unit cost data enters the political arena, it is
much more likely to be misused in justifying base closure positions, contract awards and other high
stakes political decisions.
Further, if operational commanders are given greater opportunity to exercise control, they will
certainly base decisions on comparisons of unit costs. These managers will not have access to
marginal cost data, performance measurements or any inputs other than average total cost of a
contract. This can lead to mismanagement of funds as described below.
C. EXAMPLES
Unit cost must be used with great care in reallocation decisions. Without extreme care, its use
can lead to higher rather than lower total costs to a program. As discussed in Chapter II, the firm
with the lowest ATC may not be the best choice for increased production, depending on the firm's
marginal costs. This is demonstrated by the following examples from LaCivita and Pirog [2].
Let us assume that a firm operates on the unit cost curve of Figure 8 [2]. If that firm produces
120 units of output at a unit cost of $100, the firm will require a $12,000 budget. Should its required
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output be reduced to only 60 units however, due to shifting needs or budget limitations, the unit cost
rises to $140. A simplistic decision to cut the funding in proportion to output, from $12,000 to
$6,000 would be disastrous. The firm will require at least $8,400 to function assuming efficient
operation. The attempts by the Department of the Navy (DON) to achieve variable budgets by
multiplying unit cost goals by projected output is doomed to failure. Assuming unit cost to be
constant over any change in volume is wrong. Assuming it to be constant over the potentially large
changes in volume projected due to declining force structure is dangerous.
Let us now try to compare two firms operating on the curve in Figure 8 [2]. This assumes that
they produce the same product, have the same fixed costs and get the same productivity from their
variable inputs. If firm A produces 120 units at $100 as above, the total cost of production is
$12,000. If a firm B produces 200 units at a cost of $80 per unit, its total cost of production will be
$16,000. The necessary budget then, to produce 320 units at the two facilities is $28,000. Since B
has the lower unit cost, it seems only natural that money can be saved by switching production from
A to B. This fallacy can be demonstrated by switching 60 units of production from A to B. A then
retains production of 60 units at a unit cost of $140. Production at B will increase to 260 units, but
the unit cost will increase as well to $100. The total output of 320 units now costs $34,400 or 22.86
percent higher with both unit costs above where they started. Shifting all production to B is an even
larger mistake resulting in unit costs of $140 and total costs of $44,800 or 60 percent higher than to
begin with. This figure does not even include any fixed costs from the remaining operation at A or
the costs required to close the facility. As we know from the current base closure discussions, these
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Figure 8. Unit cost example, two firms with identical unit cost functions
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To add more realism to the example, let us drop the assumption of a common ATC curve
between the two firms. In other words, we now allow them to be different sizes with different unit
cost curves. Figure 9 illustrates this example, with A being a smaller facility and B a larger facility
with greater economies of scale [2]. If both activities are allocated a low workload at Ql, firm A
will yield the lower unit cost. This will be true for any volume up to Q2. At this point, the higher
fixed overhead at the larger firm is diluted by volume and overcome by the increasing economies of
scale. Should consolidation efforts force the closure of one firm, the seemingly correct action, from
a unit cost perspective, would be to shift all production to A on the basis of its lower unit cost.
Taking this action does result in lower unit costs then previously existed at either A or B. The shift
was apparently a success, until one realizes that shifting all production to B would have been even
more successful, reducing the unit cost from C
a
' to Cb '.
Unit cost data provides unambiguous guidance in these situations only when unit costs are
constant. The key to making these decisions is knowing how unit costs change with output. In other
words, they should be using marginal costs. The limitation of marginal cost analysis is that the costs
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Figure 9. Unit cost example, two firms with unique unit cost functions
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IV. APPLICABILITY TO GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
A. ELASTICITY
While applying unit costing to government operations, there are several problems that should be
considered. These include the incentives to minimize costs and maintain quality (as determined by
the elasticity of demand and competition between suppliers), the variability of budgets, and the
ability to use units costs to evaluate bases and managers.
It can be assumed that the demand for shipyard services, along with most other Navy services, is
somewhat inelastic. While the ship's officers may elect to have the ship's crew repaint the work
spaces or lay tile to save on the repair budget, most jobs leave no choice but to pay the set price and
have the work done. The scale and complexity of work done is usually beyond the capability of the
ship's force. Specialty tooling and training limit selection to one or two locations within the ship's
area of operation. Foregoing repairs on equipment is not an option. Large scale availabilities are
usually assigned at the Fleet Scheduling Conference each year. Once assigned, the schedule rarely
changes, except in the case of overriding operational requirements.
Four elements determine elasticity. First is the availability of good substitutes. In the ship repair
setting, there are usually no substitutes. There is no substitute for an operational forced draft
blower to feed air to the boilers, or turbine generators to supply electrical power to the ship. In less
severe cases, where substitutes might be available, regulations often prohibit their use. The second
element is the percentage of available funds spent on a product or service. The lower the
percentage of funds spent, the less elastic demand will be. The items for which substitution or
cutbacks might be allowed are generally small, relatively unimportant items. The amount of time
spent finding and evaluating substitutes and the inconvenience caused by doing without, are seldom
worth the savings achieved. The third element considers whether the good or service purchased is
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considered a necessity or luxury. Habitability items are sometimes considered luxuries and are left
to be performed by the ship's crew. System repairs and inspection requirements are obviously
necessities leaving little choice for the consumer. The final consideration is the time available to
adjust to a pricing change. With enough time, alternate sources or substitutes can often be found.
However, time is seldom available when systems fail on a combatant or primary support ship.
Repairs must be made as soon as possible to maintain battle readiness against the possible outbreak
of hostilities. A ship captain does not have the choice to operate with limited capability while
searching out a better deal. While some item sourcing could be investigated for future usage,
artificial restrictions and lack of information sources often hamper this effort.
One area of debate in the effort to reform government operations is the extent to which market
choice will exist in the system, and to what degree it should. Without reasonably elastic demand
curves, there is little market incentive for monopolistic or oligopolistic providers to produce at the
lowest possible cost. In this case, cost minimization requires competition between suppliers. The
DBOF Implementation Plan Report [6] describes a system in which individual program managers
and other customers make decisions such as selecting among alternative goods and services, choosing
from competitive sources and making repair or replace decisions based on cost effectiveness. For
this to occur, two things must happen.
First, operational commanders and program managers must be given the ability to choose.
Currently, no Commanding Officer is allowed to take a ship into drydock at Yokosuka because the
service is better than at Guam. Further, no program manager can select subcontractors or parts
providers. He must rely on a host of supply corps personnel to release bids according to strict
guidelines and accept the outcome. Without choice, the system has little elasticity and little incentive
to improve.
Secondly, activities must be expected and allowed to fail. If a firm is not permitted to be put out
of business, then customers clearly are not free to select the best of competitive alternatives. If an
24
activity is not allowed to fail, there is no guarantee it is competing equally in a market, and the
greatest efficiency is not being achieved.
In addition to motivating cost savings, competition for business and the threat of closure would
act to enforce standards of quality. In the oligopolist model, competing in terms of quality and
service are preferred to cost competition. Freeing the system to act on these incentives would
eliminate the need for costly and less effective regulations and controls. It seems highly
improbable, however, that the military will let the "vagaries" of the marketplace determine force
structure. It seems even less probable that congress will do so.
B. VARIABILITY
If there is one particular aspect of the unit cost system which is more troubling than any other:
the issue of variable budgets. The Guidance [3] states that budget reviewers will require work-load
estimates on which to base the distribution of overhead when calculating unit cost goals. Those unit
cost goals will then be the mechanism for providing funding and will serve as administrative
limitations for the execution of budgetary resources. Budget resources will be "earned" by
multiplying a designated output measure by the unit cost goal. The result is that budget authority is
not fixed, but varies with work load. This has ominous implications for comptrollers who will now
be liable for Article 1517 violations as budget authority varies while the majority of their costs do
not. It seems that the management at an activity with decreasing workload is at significant risk.
Because the DOD operates within overall fiscal constraints, there are times when it will not be
possible to fund activities at the full level they have earned. This means that managers are not only
at risk due to workload fluctuations, but also due to unexpected budget marks. The comptroller at
Mare Island confirmed the difficulties of dealing with such a situation. As the unit cost letter was
being readied for distribution, Mare Island had just been notified of almost $273 million worth of
budget marks for fiscal year 1993. As they were attempting to deal with this cut, the shipyard was
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still awaiting guidance on how adjustments to the budget would be made to compensate for volume
fluctuations. All of this occurred under the cloud of article 1517 limitations, which limited the
budget options available.
Noting that the budget process usually lags the planning process by a fair amount, it seems that
leadership in the future will largely consist of contorting plans and actions to fit continuously-
changing budget situations. Not only will this detract from other vital performance concerns, but it
will also lead to the squandering of resources as coherent long-term plans are continually laid to
waste.
The DBOF Implementation Plan Report [6] addresses this issue. Paragraph II.C. in the DBOF
overview section states that while the overall utilization of resources is naturally determined by the
level of customer orders, each manager will be expected to maintain costs below the product of his
assigned unit cost goal and the level of customer work load. In short, this assumes that the unit cost
curve is flat and does not allow for variances. It has already been shown that this assumption is
incorrect as the unit cost curve is usually modelled as having a "U" shape. This policy is described as
an improvement for industrially funded activities in section IV.B.l. of the same document. This
section further states that these goals may be set at the Department level, far from the realities
which drive daily decision-making.
While shipyards participate in the Fleet Scheduling Conferences, they have little control over
changes which can greatly affect their workload. "Puts" and "takes" are supposed to be credited for
workload adjustments, but shipyards are not yet sure how they will be credited by the Navy
Comptroller (NAVCOMPT). The only discussion of this topic found is in the DBOF
Implementation Plan Report [6] which mandates determining profits or losses at the end of a fiscal
year and reflecting those amounts in price adjustments to the customer for the following year. This
means that uncontrollable workload shifts and the resulting funding shortfalls can reduce the future
competitiveness of an activity. This has potentially large repercussions as more public vs. private
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competition awards are made. The trend toward competitive award of ship overhauls is already
visible in east coast submarine SRA's. This leads to interesting questions regarding gamesmanship
in competitive bids. It may be advantageous for a private shipyard to accept a short-term loss if it
can win contracts away from Navy sources. As the volume of work decreases at the Navy shipyards,
their future year unit cost goals will rise making them less competitive for future contracts.
Additional problems are evident from examining the new budget submission process. Budget
submissions, as well as approved goals, will be expressed in unit cost terms. Unless the determining
agency is extraordinarily diligent in separating fixed from variable costs, budget marks in unit cost
terms could have much greater effects than anticipated. Further, variances in estimated workload
will have a much greater effect. Assuming 15% of the costs are variable, a ten-percent error in
predicted work-load at the Mare Island shipyard should cause a 1.5 percent error in funding. This
assumes that fixed costs are historically documented, and that budget negotiations are at the margin
for work-load and productivity. With unit costing, however, the same ten-percent error in workload
projection would result in a full ten-percent funding error. While higher authority would
undoubtedly act to mitigate the effects of this error, it seems doubtful that resources will be available
to cover budgets almost seven times as volatile as current budgets. This will undoubtedly lead to
special resolutions and embarrassment for the military and the executive branch of government.
Finally, operational budgets will be funded on a cost basis, rather than an obligation basis.
However, with externally imposed appropriation limitations, separate obligation limits may be
necessary for some functions. With multiple forms of financial tracking, it seems we are either
greatly increasing the workload on our supply officers, even as we strive to reduce their number, or
we are forcing everyone in the Navy to become an accountant. Work centers track obligations.
Outlays may occur over an uncontrollably broad range of time. As budget execution becomes
bogged down in disputes over BA, outlays, costs and confusion regarding available funding,
productivity will inevitably decline as mistakes increase.
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C. EVALUATION
Great care must be taken when attempting to use unit cost data as an evaluation tool. To be
meaningful, a manager must have control over the labor, equipment and facilities used in
production. Without these controls, deficiencies identified through unit cost differentials may reflect
only the boundaries of the environment rather than the skills of the manager. Permanent facilities,
capability requirements and labor contracts often leave management with few options to reduce cost.
Under these circumstances, a manager risks being evaluated on the firm's production function rather
than his performance.
The Unit Cost Resourcing Guidance [6] states that cost center managers should only be held
accountable for costs they are aware of and have some influence over. Given the shipyard example
presented earlier, where 85 percent of the activities costs were uncontrollable, it would seem that
unit cost will provide little data for evaluating the performance of management. Further, the Unit
Cost Resourcing Guidance [6] states that activities must still be responsive to corporate policy, even
if that policy increases their unit cost. While unit cost encourages management to look at all
overhead, including capital costs, in terms of the output, commanders will have little control over
these costs. Given these environmental restrictions, it seems unit cost data is ill suited for the stated
role of performance evaluation.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The unit cost system is much more than a new budget tool. By attempting to alter the decision-
making process of military management, it is altering the economic model under which military
activities operate. Incorporating performance measurement and evaluation into the system adds
personal incentive to the market forces affecting system managers. Both opportunities and concerns
come with this new, or at least altered, economic model.
Operating in the oligopolistic model, the competition between suppliers embodied in the unit
costing initiatives have great potential to reduce cost and improve quality. Focusing on a naval
shipyard as an illustration, increased competition, such as is occurring in East Coast SRA's,
encourages activities to lower cost. Further, in the oligopolistic model, competition is more likely to
occur on the basis of quality and service. While external mechanisms exist in the shipyard case to
insure quality, this effect can save on the costly regulations and controls required on other
producers.
Unfortunately, there is doubt as to how much the final implementation of unit cost will resemble
a free market. By centrally dictating prices through unit cost goals and forcing shipyards to accept
all work at this price, the ability of supply and demand to insure efficient production has been lost.
Without this market interaction, the incentive to improve quality is also lost. Not only does this
require maintaining cumbersome quality control systems, but these systems must be expanded as the
incentive exists to reduce quality to achieve unit cost savings.
Additional questions regarding incentives evolve from unit costing's treatment of variable
budgeting and personal performance appraisal. Determining future year pricing based on past year
performance does not promote efficient production and risks a dangerous round of gamesmanship
with private shipyards as consolidations and workload reductions strain profitability. Linking
performance appraisal to budget results risks forfeiting long-term considerations such as R&D for
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short-term unit cost reductions. It also appears to be of questionable value for this purpose as
results may reflect an activities production function and external constraints, rather than the
capabilities of management.
In addition to these concerns are questions regarding the suitability of unit costing to the military
environment. If the data generated is used in a manner inconsistent with economic theory, great
damage could be done. This was demonstrated in the examples comparing ATC and marginal cost
as a basis for reallocation decisions. Improper measures of effectiveness and improper comparison
of results can defeat the very purposes of the system.
While the promise of free market reforms is alluring, the unit cost system, as currently
structured, could do more harm than good. Without strong commitment to allow full free-market
action in all areas of service, potential gains will always be limited and additional programs will be
necessary to maintain quality. Significant risk is fostered by allowing only partial competition and
limiting government activities through such actions as dictating pricing and volume. It seems that a
preferable course of action would be to either remain safe and maintain central control, or to throw
open the doors to the potential gains of free market action. By attempting to do both, unit cost
risks doing neither, giving up safety without the promise of large savings.
At this time, the unit cost system is still being revised. Shipyards have not yet received much unit
cost guidance, and many planned improvements to the system have not yet been implemented. As a
result, comparative budget data to investigate changes under unit costing was not available. A
follow-on examination of how unit costing is implemented in the shipyard environment would
provide a good area for future study. Of particular interest is the degree to which free market
action will be allowed, and how steady-state operation under unit costing affects repair or replace
decisions and workload breakdown and distribution.
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